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Abstract
I examine whether the availability of health coverage through the spouse’s health plan
influences a married woman’s decision to become self-employed. The Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA86) introduced a tax subsidy for the self-employed to purchase their
own health insurance. I test whether this ‘natural’ experiment induced more women
without spousal health insurance coverage to select into self-employment. The most
conservative difference-in-difference estimates based on an analysis of employed women
indicate that the incidence of self-employment among single women rose by 10% in
the post-TRA86 period, while a multinomial specification based on a sample of both
employed and non-employed women suggests that the increase was about 13%.
JEL Classification: J0,J3,I1
Keywords: Health Insurance, Self-Employment
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1 Introduction
The incidence of self-employment increased in the United States since the mid-1970s, both
among men and women. Unincorporated self-employment rose from 6.9% in 1970 to 7.5% in
1990 (Hipple, 2004). This phenomenon is well-documented by Blau (1987), Devine (1994a,
1994b), Lombard (2001), Hipple (2004) and many others. Devine (1994a) reported a 3
percentage-point increase in female self-employment between 1975 and 1989, while the male
self-employment rate registered a 2 percentage point increase over the same period. Her data
is reproduced in Table 1. While there was some controversy over whether this represented a
sustained increase for men, there was a general consensus that this represented a long-term
trend for women, with the self-employment rate increasing both absolutely and relative to
total female employment (Budig, 2003). Moreover, Devine (1994a) and Lombard (2001)
emphasized the prevalence of married women in self-employment.
The absolute increase in the numbers of self-employed women is not surprising in itself.
This could simply be a consequence of their labor force participation, which rose from 43% in
1970 to 58% by 1990, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).1 Moreover, the share
of employment in the service sector rose from around 16% in 1970 to 24% in 1984 (Personick,
1985). This large increase in service sector employment expanded the opportunities for self-
employment, thus potentially accounting for the relative increase in self-employment rates.
These factors were, however, common to most industrialized economies and yet, trends in
self-employment were far from uniform across these countries.
Schuetze (1998) documented declines as well as increases in self-employment rates across
OECD countries during the 1970s and 1980s. He compared male non-primary self-employment
rates in Canada and the United States during the 1983-1994 period. These two countries are
similar in terms of the overall institutional structure, including labor markets, but differ con-
siderably in their income tax policies and macroeconomic conditions. Importantly, Canada
had increasing income tax rates and a deteriorating macroeconomic environment relative to




were higher in Canada than in the U.S. during this period. Moreover, the self-employment
rate for this group fell in the U.S. while it increased in Canada. Thus, he argues that
country-specific or region-specific factors were primarily responsible for the evolution of self-
employment rates. One institutional feature that sets the U.S. apart from other OECD
countries is the linkage between the labor market and health care provision.
In the U.S., employment-based health insurance is the dominant form of financing health
care; over two-thirds of non-elderly Americans receive health insurance through employers,
either their own or that of a family member (Cutler, 2002). This is due to the fact that the
tax code in the U.S. subsidizes employer payments for health insurance, by excluding these
payments from both income and payroll taxes. On the other hand, employee contributions
for health insurance are paid with after-tax dollars.2 Thus, employers have an incentive
to finance insurance premium costs rather than shift these costs to employees. This is
especially the case in large companies where employers have greater bargaining power with
insurance companies, and risks can be spread over more people.3 Even if employees bear
the full incidence of these costs in the form of lower wages, group rates of insurance offered
by employers are substantially below individually-purchased insurance rates due to adverse
selection in insurance markets.4
The above factors make the after-tax price of employer-provided health insurance sub-
stantially lower than the price of individually-purchased health insurance. These features, in
effect, create a wedge in the price of health insurance between the wage-employment sector
on the one hand, and the self-employment and non-employment sectors on the other. This
price wedge is likely to create a distortion in employment-sector decisions; for some workers
who have a preference for being self-employed, the price of selecting into their desired sector
2The only exception is where employers offer Section 125 plans, also known as ‘cafeteria plans’, that are
specifically excluded from the calculation of gross income for federal income tax purposes.
3Brown et.al. (1990) found that small firms were less likely to offer health insurance or pension benefits.
Moreover, three-fourths of workers without health insurance coverage worked for firms with fewer than 500
employees.
4Adverse selection obtains when individuals’ demand for health insurance is positively correlated with
their underlying health risk, which is not fully revealed to the insurer. This information asymmetry induces
risk-based sorting into health insurance plans.
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of employment may be too high. Married couples, however, have the opportunity to appro-
priate the surplus created by the price wedge; health coverage through the spouse’s health
insurance plan allows married workers who enjoy this benefit to effectively eliminate the
price wedge. This could explain the predominance of married women in self-employment.
This problem is important because the U.S. labor market is perceived as a very flexible
market relative to that of other industrialized countries, in terms of the availability of part-
time jobs and access to flexible work schedules. However, employers rarely, if ever, provide
health benefits to part-time workers. And as stated above, the self-employed do not receive a
tax benefit that is comparable to the benefit extended to employment-based health insurance.
Thus, in addition to the problem of adverse selection in insurance markets, the prevalence
of the system of employer-provided health insurance with the associated tax advantages
imposes a cost on individuals opting for flexible work schedules, in the form of higher after-
tax prices for health insurance.5 Increases in the cost of health insurance can widen this
price wedge and affect an individual’s choice of employment sector.
There is an extensive literature on the effect of employment-based health insurance on
various labor market outcomes6 Notably, there is compelling evidence that insurance has a
significant effect on the timing of retirement; individuals with post-retirement health insur-
ance provided by their employer are likely to retire much earlier than those without such
insurance. The literature on ‘job-lock’ suggests that health insurance plays an important
role in the job-mobility decisions of individuals. Moreover, the effect of this form of insur-
ance on the labor supply decisions - mainly hours of work - of secondary earners is also well
established.7 However, there has been very little research on the effect of employment-based
insurance on households’ choice of employment sector.8 This neglect is surprising, given
the sharp increase in self-employment rates since the mid-1970s. One of the reasons for the
absence of convincing empirical evidence on this relationship is the difficulty in finding an
exogenous source of variation in health insurance prices.
5Holtz-Eakin et.al. (1996) state that for comparable insurance plans and benefits, small businesses and
the self-employed pay 10%-40% more in health insurance costs, relative to those in wage-salary employment.
6Gruber and Madrian (2002) review the literature.
7See Buchmueller and Valletta (1999), for example.
8Fairlie et.al. (2008) and Gumus and Regan (2009) are notable exceptions.
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) provides an opportunity to isolate the effect of the
price of health insurance on employment-sector choices. TRA86 introduced a tax subsidy for
the self-employed to purchase their own health insurance. This subsidy effectively lowered
the after-tax cost of health insurance for the self-employed. However, individuals enjoying
health coverage through the insurance plan of a family member could not avail of this benefit.
Using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data for the relevant period, I therefore test
whether this policy change induced more women without spousal health coverage to select
into self-employment.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I discuss the methodological issues that
arise in estimating the impact of spousal health benefits on a womans choice of work sector.
Section 3 describes the data set used for the analysis and presents some descriptive statistics.
I discuss the empirical strategy for testing my hypothesis in Section 4 and present my results
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Health Insurance and the Tax Reform Act 1986
The U.S. tax system favors employer-provided health insurance over individually-purchased
insurance in several respects. “Employer-provided insurance strictly dominates insurance
purchased on own account for both itemizing and non-itemizing taxpayers, due to the higher
loading factors on individual policies, the full deductibility of employer-provided insurance
expenditures relative to the partial deductibility of own insurance expenditures, and the
deductibility of employer-provided health insurance from the payroll tax as well as the income
tax.” (Gruber and Poterba, 1994). Four other papers examine the linkage between women’s
employment-sector choices and spousal health insurance.
Using cross-sectional data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the 1975-87
period, Devine (1994a, 1994b) found that self-employed women were more likely to be mar-
ried, to be covered by someone else’s health plan and to work non-standard hours. Using
the same data source for a later period, Lombard (2001) found that women’s likelihood of
self-employment rises with health coverage through the spouse. Wellington (2001) also used
the CPS to estimate the impact of health insurance coverage through the spouse on the
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probability of self-employment, and found evidence of a positive association between these
variables. None of these papers examine the effect of the price of health insurance on the
decision to become self-employed.
If there are no unobserved factors affecting the employment-sector decisions of house-
holds, then using cross-sectional variation in spousal health insurance coverage, after con-
trolling for other observed characteristics, would correctly identify the effect of the price of
health insurance on self-employment propensities. However, if there are factors affecting
spouses’ employment sector decisions that are not observed by the econometrician, then
these estimates are likely to be biased.
For instance, it is possible that the observed pattern of assignment of married work-
ers across employment sectors is driven by heterogeneity in the taste for risk. A married
household that is maximizing joint household utility may have one spouse taking up a risky
entrepreneurial venture with the objective of making higher returns relative to the wage-
salary sector, with the other spouse working in the less risky wage sector and providing a
stable income. On the other hand, a more risk-loving couple may decide that the benefits of
flexibility and higher potential returns in self-employment outweigh the costs of higher risk.
If employment sector decisions are based purely on these risk-return trade-offs, changes in
the price of health insurance may not have a sizeable effect on shifting workers across sectors.
We thus need a methodological approach that allows us to disentangle these effects.
Fairlie et.al.(2008) examine whether the system of employer-provided health insurance in
the U.S. has impeded entrepreneurial activity, a situation they refer to as ‘entrepreneurship
lock’. They examine transitions from wage-employment to self-employment using CPS data,
as a function of family health status and access to alternative health insurance options. They
also exploit the discontinuity in health insurance coverage at age 65 created by Medicare,
studying entrepreneurship behaviour of individuals below age 65 to those above. Using this
strategy, however, it is difficult to disentangle the price effect of health insurance from a
preference to transition into retirement gradually by working fewer hours, which is afforded
by self-employment.9 For this reason, a natural experiment like the TRA86 is potentially a
better instrument for identifying the price effect of health insurance on the propensity for
9See Zissimopoulos et.al. (2007) and Giandrea et.al. (2008), for instance.
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self-employment.
The TRA86 introduced a tax subsidy on health insurance purchases by the self-employed.
After this reform, self-employed individuals who itemized their income-tax deductions could
claim a tax deduction for 25% of their health insurance costs. This subsidy therefore lowered
the after-tax price of health insurance for those self-employed individuals who itemized their
deductions. Gurley-Calvez (2006) examined whether the TRA86 health insurance subsidy
decreased the exit rate from self-employment. Using panel data from the University of Michi-
gan Tax Research Database, she defined the self-employed as those who filed a Schedule C
along with their tax return. Schedule C lists income and expenses related to self-employment
and is used by sole proprietors, who are most likely to be eligible for the health insurance
deduction. Using this definition, she found that the rate of exit from self-employment de-
creased following TRA86. Besides, the effect was much more sizable for single individuals.
She estimated an elasticity of -1.06 for single filers and -0.12 for married filers.
Gruber and Poterba (1994) calculated the average after-tax price of health insurance rel-
ative to self-insurance, for employed and self-employed individuals before and after TRA86.
Their calculations are presented in Table 2 and reveal that the after-tax price reductions
were significant for the self-employed but negligible for those in wage-employment. For the
high-income self-employed, the price reduction was in excess of 10%. However, since the
subsidy was restricted to those who were not eligible for health coverage through the spouse,
it is only this group of workers that received the ‘treatment’. Hence, the demographic group
that was most likely to respond to the subsidy was single individuals. Consistent with their
prediction, they found that health insurance take-up increased considerably among single,
self-employed individuals after TRA86 was introduced. They estimated the price elasticity
of demand for insurance to be -1.8.
In this paper, I estimate the effect of TRA86 on a different outcome: the propensity for
self-employment. I test whether a greater proportion of single workers and married workers
with no access to spousal health insurance coverage, selected into self-employment after
TRA86. Figure 1 plots self-employment rates for men and women between 1979 and 2004,
using data from the March supplement files of the Current Population Survey (CPS). There is
a discernible increase in self-employment rates for both men and women following the TRA86.
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However, I focus on women because women’s health insurance coverage and employment
decisions are likely to be more endogenous with respect to their spouse’s compensation
package, compared to those of men.10
One major challenge arises in using the TRA86 experiment to estimate the effect on
employment sector choices. In addition to introducing the tax subsidy for the self-employed,
TRA86 also lowered marginal tax rates significantly. If this is the primary reason for the
trend increase in self-employment that Figure 1 reflects, then I may be wrongly attributing
these increases to the change in the price of health insurance implied by the tax subsidy.
I address this concern and present evidence suggesting that lowered marginal tax rates are
not the primary source of my findings.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) data, which collects detailed informa-
tion on personal and family characteristics of respondents, labor force variables and health
insurance status in the previous calendar year. However in the March files before 1989,
owner-operators of incorporated businesses were coded as wage-salary workers. This is prob-
lematic for my analysis. Fortunately, the May CPS data files contain one question pertaining
to the current job of the respondent, where both the unincorporated and incorporated self-
employed are separately classified.
I match the March and May CPS files for 2 years - 1984 and 1985 - to create a sample of
women for the pre-TRA86 period. This way, I get all the data on labor force and personal
10A series of amendments made to the TRA86 between 1996 and 2003 gradually increased the tax credit for
health insurance purchases by the self-employed, from 25% to 100%. These changes were not accompanied
by changes in the marginal tax rate schedule. Gumus and Regan (2009) examine the impact of these
amendments on entry and exit rates into self-employment, and on the propensity to be self-employed among
men. They find significant but small effects on entry, but no effects on exit rates or on the likelihood of
being self-employed. Self-employment over the 1993-2003 period does not exhibit an increasing trend; male
self-employment actually declined over this period, as Figure 1 reveals. Moreover, the gradual nature of the
increase in subsidy over this period makes it difficult to identify significant changes in trend that can be
attributed to the subsidy. For this reason, I consider the impact of the original TRA86 subsidy, which was
discrete and sizable, relative to the 1996-2003 amendments.
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characteristics and health insurance status from the March files and a correct identification
of self-employed workers from the May files. However, the labor force information pertains
to the main job during the week prior to the survey while the health information refers to
the longest job held the previous year. While this is likely to cause a mismatch between job
characteristics and insurance status for a subset of our sample, a number of papers (Swartz
(1986) and Shore-Sheppard (1996)) find that March CPS respondents interpret the health
insurance questions as pertaining to their current job, and answer accordingly. To the extent
that this occurs, it not only mitigates the problem but also suggests that using retrospective
employment status and job characteristics data is likely to cause similar problems. From
1989 on, the March CPS files contain separate data on the incorporated self-employed. For
data after 1988, I therefore use the March files alone.
All persons 15 years and older in the survey who worked in the previous calendar year
were asked if they participated in group health insurance plans offered by their employer.
I matched the husband-wife pairs in the data and used the responses to these questions
to ascertain whether a married woman’s spouse had employer-provided health insurance
coverage.11 A married woman whose spouse has health insurance coverage through his
employer is more likely to be covered under the same plan. Therefore, this variable proxies
for the price of health insurance; women whose spouse has an employer-provided health plan
can be thought of as paying a smaller price for selecting into self-employment, relative to
women whose spouse does not have coverage.
Since the policy changes introduced in the TRA86 went into effect in 1988, I combine
data from the March CPS files from 1990 and 1991 to construct a post-TRA86 sample of
women. To keep the data consistent across the two periods, I use the labor force information
pertaining to the week prior to the survey. I focus on women aged between 18 and 64, who
are employed in civilian, non-agricultural occupations or not employed. Individuals reporting
themselves to be self-employed on their main job during the week prior to the survey are
11Individuals who respond in the affirmative to whether they have employer-provided health insurance
are asked whether their spouse and children are also covered by the same policy. Thus, it is possible to
determine whether a married woman has coverage under her husband’s employer-provided health insurance
plan. However, to mitigate the endogeneity of insurance coverage, I only use the husband’s own coverage
status as a covariate.
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classified as self-employed.
The subsidy introduced by TRA86 was more valuable for some members of the treat-
ment group than to others - those facing higher income taxes. I make use of this variation
to examine the differential effects of marginal tax rates on self-employment. I estimate the
federal marginal tax rates for the individuals in my sample using the NBER’s TAXSIM pro-
gramme. To mitigate the endogeneity of tax rates with respect to the employment decision,
the estimates are based on marital status and the number of dependent children only. In the
case of married women, the tax rates are estimated with respect to their husband’s earnings.
Table 3 records employment status by marital status. While self-employment rose among
all marital groups over the two time periods, the largest increase was among married women
with no access to spousal health insurance coverage, followed by single women. In contrast,
the incidence of wage-employment decreased among these two groups, while it rose among
married women with access to spousal health coverage. The change in self-employment
among married women with access to health insurance and the change in paid employment
among married women with no access to health insurance are not significant. All other
changes are significant.
Table 4 gives the characteristics of employed women in the two time periods, 1984-85
and 1990-91. On average, self-employed women tend to be older than their counterparts in
wage-salary employment and this difference has increased over time. Average educational
attainment increased for all women over the two time periods. The predominance of white
women in self-employment has also been noted by Devine (1994a) and Lombard (2001), and
is clearly reflected in Table 4.
The CPS does not collect any information on household assets. However, it does include
family income from sources other than earnings. This variable can be used to proxy for
family wealth, to control for liquidity constraints that might restrict women’s choice of
employment sectors (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). I create an indicator variable that equals
1 for individuals whose annual family non-earnings income in real terms was over $50,000, and
0 for whom it was $50,000 or less.12 The fraction of self-employed women with non-earnings
12The motivation for using an indicator variable based on a threshold, instead of using the actual reported
income is to overcome measurement error. See for instance, Bollinger (1998).
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family income over the defined threshold is about three times more than the corresponding
fraction for those in wage-employment, in both time periods. The differences by marital
status are also dramatic.
Self-employment among single women increased by over 6 percentage points between
the two time periods. However, a notably higher proportion of self-employed women are
married, constituting over 75% of all self-employed women in each of the two time periods.
Among the sub-sample of married women, over half the fraction of self-employed women
have a spouse who is covered by his employer-provided health plan. This fraction is lower
among married women in wage employment. This suggests that the cost of health insurance
may be an important determinant of the employment-sector decision. At the same time,
a large fraction of self-employed women’s spouses are also self-employed. This fraction is
significantly higher than the corresponding fraction for wage and salaried women in both
time periods. This in turn suggests that household employment-sector decisions are also
driven by preferences and not solely by the cost of health insurance. These patterns reinforce
the argument that the joint distribution of employment-sector choices and spousal health
insurance offers limited information on the relationship between health insurance prices and
employment-sector choices. The tax reform act of 1986, by providing an exogenous source
of variation in health insurance prices, allows us to potentially identify this relationship.
4 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and Self-Employment
The hypothesis that I am testing in this paper is the following: since TRA86 lowered the price
of health insurance for the self-employed, this policy change induced more single women and
more married women without health insurance coverage through their spouse’s insurance
plan, to select into self-employment, relative to married women who already had access
to health insurance coverage through their spouse. TRA86 explicitly includes a provision
disqualifying self-employed individuals who are eligible for insurance coverage through a
spouse, from taking advantage of the tax subsidy (Gruber and Poterba, 1994). Therefore,
this group serves as a good control group, and the difference-in-difference estimate of the
impact of the insurance subsidy on the incidence of self-employment is given by the following
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equation:
∆2 = (SE1991a − SE1985a ) − (SE1991b − SE1985b ) (1)
where SEt denotes the percentage self-employed at period t and the subscripts a and b refer
to our comparison groups - either single and married women respectively, or women without
and with spousal health coverage respectively. Thus, I use both cross-sectional variation -
between women with potential health insurance coverage through their spouse versus women
without - and the time-series variation - before versus after TRA86 - in order to identify the
effect of the price of health insurance on self-employment propensities.
Two crucial assumptions underlie the approach adopted to identify the impact of TRA86
on self-employment propensities: (1) that trends in self-employment propensities for the
treatment and control groups are equal in the absence of treatment, and (2) the economic
environment over time has a similar impact on the labour-market behaviour of the two
groups; underlying trends in outcomes that differ by demographic group will violate this
assumption. I address these issues in Section 5.
Health insurance prices may impact not only the choice of employment sector but the
labor market participation decision itself. For instance, Eissa (1995) estimated an increase
in the labor force participation rate of high-income married women following TRA86, which
she attributed to the lowering of marginal tax rates. This implies that the characteristics of
women working in 1990-91 are likely to be quite different from those working in 1984-85, and
failure to account for this might lead to a composition bias in estimates using the limited
sample of employed women. It is therefore important to include the non-employed in the
analysis and treat non-employment as a separate state. Thus, I also present estimates from
a multinomial logit (MNL) model, by expanding my sample to include women who are not
employed.
5 Results
In this section, I present estimates of the impact of the health insurance subsidy introduced
by TRA86 on self-employment propensity, using the following comparison groups: (1) single
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women and married women with no access to spousal health insurance coverage (two treat-
ment groups) versus married women with access to spousal health coverage (control group);
(2) single women (treatment group) versus married women (control group). I first estimate
these differences using a sample of employed women only, and subsequently, using the entire
sample of women, including the unemployed and those not in the labor force.
5.1 Single and Married Women with no Spousal Health Coverage
Access, versus Married Women with Access
I calculate the double-difference estimates described in the above section for my first com-
parison groups, by running the following regression:
Ei = α + γ1(Married, no health coverage) + γ2(Single) + γ3(Post Reform)+ (2)
γ4(Married, no health coverage ∗ Post Reform) + γ5(Single ∗ Post Reform)+
γ6.Xi + εi,
where Ei = 1 if the woman is self-employed and Ei = 0 otherwise, Xi is a vector of controls,
‘Married,no health coverage’ is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the woman is married
but has no access to health coverage through her spouse13, ‘Single’ is an indicator for a single
woman (never married, divorced, widowed or separated), ‘Post Reform’ is another indicator
variable which equals 1 if the observation is from 1990-91 and equals 0 if it is from 1984-
85 and εi is a normally distributed error term. Our control group here is married women
with access to health coverage through their spouse. Since this is the group that remained
unaffected by TRA86, we expect the self-employment incidence for all the ‘treatment’ groups
to increase in the post-reform period. Thus, my prediction is that γ4 and γ5 are both positive.
The estimates in the second column of Table 5 are the marginal effects of control vari-
ables as well as difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of TRA86 on self-employment
propensities, based on a probit regression. I calculate the marginal effects on the interac-
tion terms using the method outlined by Ai et. al. (2004). I average the marginal effect
13In other words, her husband does not have an employer-provided health insurance plan
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across individuals to get the average marginal effect. The Delta method is used to compute
standard errors.14 The estimates of age, education, race, marginal tax rate, martial sta-
tus and presence of dependents have the expected sign, and are all statistically significant.
On average, single women and married women with no access to health insurance coverage
through their spouse are, respectively, 5 percentage points and 2 percentage points less likely
to be self-employed relative to married women with access to spousal health insurance. The
estimate of family income is also noteworthy. Its effect is positive, sizeable and significant,
suggesting that non-earnings income is an important determinant of self-employment.15
The marginal effects of the interaction terms are the difference-in-difference estimates.
These estimates are positive and significant for both treatment groups. The marginal effects
indicate that in the post-reform period, single women and married women who did not
have access to spousal health insurance were 74% and 69% more likely to be self-employed
respectively, relative to their corresponding pre-reform rates (0.0323 for single women and
0.0575 for married women with no access to spousal health coverage respectively). When
measured as a fraction of the predicted probabilities of self-employment estimated by the
regression (0.0706), the marginal effects imply a 34% and 56% increase in self-employment
respectively among the two treatment groups, relative to the control group.
5.2 Single Women versus Married Women
One could argue that the above results are based on treatment and control groups that
are endogenously determined. For example, the wife’s ability to obtain subsidized health
insurance through her self-employment status could impact the husband’s decision to choose
a job that offers health insurance versus one that does not. To get around this endogeneity, I
next use marital status to divide up my sample into potential treatment and control groups.
Single women represent the ‘uncontaminated’ sub-group of the treatment group for TRA86,
14Note that marginal effects based on the method proposed by Ai et.al. (2004) are smaller than those
based solely on the interaction terms such as γ4 and γ5 in equation 2. There is some controversy regarding
which of these methods captures the true treatment effect of a policy change (Puhani, 2008). I have chosen
to report the more conservative estimates here.
15The results are robust to alternative thresholds.
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since they cannot have access to spousal health coverage. I therefore estimate the effect of
TRA86 on the self-employment probabilities of single women, relative to married women. I
run the following regression:
Ei = α + γ9(Single) + γ10(Post Reform) + γ11(Single ∗ Post Reform) + γ12Xi + εi, (3)
where Ei = 1 if the woman is self-employed and Ei = 0 otherwise, Xi is a vector of controls,
‘Single’ is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the woman is single (never married, divorced,
widowed or separated) and equals 0 if she is married, and all the other terms are as defined
for the earlier specification. The coefficient γ11 measures the double-difference - the effect
of the tax subsidy on single women’s propensity to be self-employed, relative to married
women. Again, γ11 is predicted to be positive. The results are presented in column 3 of
Table 5.
The differential effect of being single in the post-TRA86 period is indeed positive and
significant. The marginal effect of 0.0078 indicates that single women in the post-TRA86
period were 24% more likely to take up self-employment relative to their pre-reform rate
of 3.23%. This is a sizeable effect. The marginal effect implies a 10% increase in self-
employment among single women, when measured as a fraction of the predicted probability
of self-employment generated by the regression, 0.0811. These estimates are smaller than the
difference-in-difference estimates in column 2. This is unsurprising since the control group
(married women) includes those who were also eligible for the health insurance subsidy.
We can potentially interpret these as lower bound estimates of the impact of the health
insurance subsidy. The estimates of the other control variables are similar to those in the
second column.
5.3 Robustness Tests
To address the first concern expressed in section 4 that underlying trends in self-employment
may have been different among the treatment and control groups, Figure 2 plots self-
employment rates for single and married women before TRA86 was introduced. As the graph
reveals, both groups experienced similar trend growth in self-employment until TRA86. This
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suggests that differential changes observed after TRA86 cannot be attributed to pre-existing
trends. I also estimated Probit models of specifications based on equation 2 and equation
3, controlling for secular changes in outcomes.16 The estimates in Table 5 are robust to the
inclusion of these secular trends. The results are not reported here.
Many studies have found that self-employment is more prevalent among older individuals.
To test how the results vary by age, I estimate Probit models based on equation 2 for
different sub-groups based on age. Panel A of Table 6 reports marginal effects on the
variables of interest, including the difference-in-difference estimates, for different age groups
in the sample. In column 2, estimates from Table 5 are reproduced, for comparison with the
other sub-samples. The marginal effects for the 24-53 age group and the 54-64 age group
are consistently higher than those based on the entire sample - this is the case both for
the treatment group dummies as well as the difference-in-difference estimates. In the 24-53
age group, the difference-in-difference estimates of 0.0245 and 0.0418 represent a 34% and
57% increase in self-employment propensity for the two treatment groups respectively, when
measured as a fraction of the predicted probability of self-employment (0.0731) from the
estimated equation for that sub-group. The corresponding percentages for the 54-64 sub-
sample are 46% and 63% respectively. Thus, the estimated effects are robust across different
age groups, and bigger in the sample of older individuals.
To address the second concern expressed in section 4 that the economic environment over
time may have had a different impact on the labour-market behaviour of the treatment and
control groups, I re-estimate the Probit regressions for different age-groups as in Panel A,
but add the following controls: each treatment group dummy is interacted with the male
unemployment rate for the four time periods used in the analysis: 1984, 1985, 1990 and 1991.
The male unemployment rate is used to proxy for business-cycle effects in each period. The
interaction between this variable and the treatment dummy variables therefore allows for
diverse business-cycle responses by the different demographic groups. The objective is thus
16Specifically, the indicator variable Post Reform in equation 2 and equation 3 was replaced with three
time/year dummy variables - one each for the years 1985, 1990 and 1991, with 1984 being the left-out
category. These time dummies were in turn interacted with the treatment dummy variables. The results
were very similar to those reported in Table 5 - for all treatment groups, self-employment increased in the
years 1990 and 1991 relative to 1984, while the changes in year 1985 were inconclusive.
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to examine whether the main results hold, even when we allow various groups to respond
differently to the economic environment.
The results in Panel B of Table 6 indicate that the main results are robust to the inclusion
of differential business cycle responses; the difference-in-difference estimates are bigger for
single women and smaller for married women with no access to spousal health insurance,
relative to the corresponding estimates in Panel A. Nevertheless, all estimates are positive
and significant, suggesting that even after controlling for potentially different responses to
the economic environment, the incentive effects of the health insurance subsidy introduced
in TRA86 have the predicted impact on self-employment propensities. 17
5.4 Impact of Lowered Tax Rates
In addition to introducing the tax subsidy for the self-employed, TRA86 also significantly
lowered marginal tax rates; it lowered the top marginal tax rate by 44% while the decrease
was less significant for those at the lower end of the income distribution (Feldstein, 1986).
A lowering of tax rates increases the after-tax price of employer-provided health insurance,
thus lowering the value of this form of insurance relative to self-insurance. However, the
predominant effect of lowered tax rates is expected to be on labor supply, notably on the
extensive margin; Eissa (1995) showed that the labor force participation of high-income
married women increased after TRA86, as a result of the decrease in marginal tax rates.
One concern that arises is that my findings might have very little to do with the price of
health insurance and might simply reflect the fact that, following TRA86, lowered tax rates
made employment in all sectors more attractive to women.
Figure 3 plots the trend in paid employment over the 1979-1989 period. The figure reveals
no discernible change in the overall trend, following TRA86. Wage employment rates for
men show a slight decline. While there is a slight upward trend in these rates for women,
this increase is not as sharp as the trend in self-employment, suggesting that increases in
self-employment rates after the reform were not driven by changes in the marginal tax rates
alone. Hausman and Poterba (1987) estimated the distribution of changes in marginal tax
17I also estimated Probit models based on equation 3 for these different sub-groups based on age. The
results were similar to those reported in Column 3 of Table 5, and are not reported here.
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rates in the population, following the changes introduced by the TRA86. Their calculations
are reproduced in Figure 4, and reveal that a very small share of households - around 11% -
experienced a fall in the marginal tax rate in excess of 10%. For the majority of households,
the decrease was modest. A sizeable share of households - around 14% - faced no change
at all while a significant fraction actually experienced an increase in the rate facing them.
Thus, while nearly 60% of households faced decreases in marginal tax rates, the decrease
was extremely modest for the majority of these households.
Moore (2003) estimated the effect of lowered marginal and average tax rates on self-
employment, using the tax reforms of 1986 and 1993 as natural experiments. While he
reports a small negative effect of the 1986 reforms on self-employment, his results are not
robust to alternate specifications and sample restrictions. He finds that other factors such
as education, attitude towards risk and wealth seem more important in explaining self-
employment decisions, relative to tax rates. He concludes that “...changing marginal tax
rates does not seem to be the best policy tool for promoting self-employment.” (Moore,
2003, p.25). Using aggregated individual data from seven decennial Censuses of Population
in the U.S., Fairlie and Meyer (1998) also found no significant relationship between tax rates
and self-employment.
Taken together, the various pieces of evidence cited above suggest that the effect of
lowered income taxes on self-employment following TRA86, was likely to have been modest.
To attribute the increased propensity for self-employment implied by the estimates in Tables
5 and 6 entirely to lowered marginal tax rates, one would have to argue that lowering income
tax rates made self-employment more attractive to single women, while not changing the
desirability of paid employment. This argument is difficult to support, as higher rates of
self-employment are typically associated with high marginal tax rates, presumably because
it is easier to under-report self-employment income relative to wage-salary income (Blau,
1987). Moore’s (2003) results are consistent with this view. The negative and significant
estimates of marginal tax rates in Table 5 also support this thesis.
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5.5 Plausibility of Estimates
The net cost savings from the tax subsidy were presumably quite small, for most individuals.
According to Gruber and Poterba’s (1994) estimates using the NBER’s TAXSIM model, less
than half of self-employed tax filers in most income classes had availed of the deduction
in 1988/89, though this share did increase over time. Gurley-Calvez’s (2006) calculations
using tax returns data show that the share of filers claiming the deduction increased by 4
percentage points from over 11% in 1988 to more than 15% in 1990. The average dollar
value of deductions claimed also increased from $427 to $536. In 1988, a deduction of $427
represented a tax savings of $120 - or 7% of the premium total - for a household in the 28
percent marginal tax bracket. The question arises whether the increases in self-employment
found here are plausible, given the magnitude of the decrease in net insurance costs.
According to Gruber and Poterba (1994), TRA86 led to a 6.8 percentage point increase
in private insurance coverage among the self-employed (men and women), relative to the em-
ployed (Gruber and Poterba (1994), Table VI, p.720). One could imagine that this increased
take-up was driven entirely by women who were already self-employed, with no increase in
self-employment rates due to TRA86, giving us a lower bound of 0 for the impact of the
TRA86 subsidy on self-employment. At the other extreme, this increased take-up could be
accounted for entirely by new entrants into self-employment, with no change in the insurance
status of those already self-employed when TRA86 was announced. This gives us an upper
bound of 6.8 percentage points that can be attributed to the tax subsidy. The estimates in
Tables 5, and 6 lie well within these bounds - between 1 and 4 percentage points - and thus
provide confidence in the plausibility of the estimates.18
18Gruber and Madrian (2002), in their review paper, report a lower bound of 10% and an upper bound of
35% for the magnitude of ‘job-lock’. My estimates of the impact of the TRA86 subsidy on self-employment
are between 10% and 34% for single women, when measured as a fraction of the predicted probability of
self-employment in the respective regressions. These estimates are thus consistent with those of the ‘job-lock’
literature as well, for this group.19
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5.6 Multinomial Logit Estimates
The 1980s was a period of increasing labor force participation among women in the United
States. Moreover, as discussed above, there is evidence suggesting that TRA86 increased
female labor force participation, especially that of married women. In this section, I address
the concern that restricting the sample solely to employed women could introduce a com-
position bias in the estimates. I expand the sample to include non-employed women and
extend the analysis to incorporate all three employment-status outcomes - working in paid
employment, self-employed and not-employed.20
The effect of the TRA86 on self-employment is now estimated using a multinomial logit
model, pooling data from before and after the tax reform. The results are presented in Table
7, which reports parameter estimates for the variables of interest, based on a specification
that is analogous to equations 2 and 3. The relative risk ratios for wage-employment and non-
employment are shown, relative to the self-employment outcome, along with the marginal
effects for all outcomes. The top and bottom panels report estimates based on treatment
and control groups as defined in equation 2 and equation 3 respectively.
The relative risk ratios in the top panel indicate that compared to married women with
access to spousal health coverage, the two treatment groups - single women, and married
women with no access to spousal health coverage - are, respectively, over two times and
about 1.4 times more likely to be in paid employment than in self-employment, with sub-
stantial and significant marginal effects. In the post-reform period, however, single women
and married women with no access to spousal health coverage were 9 percentage points
and 16 percentage points less likely to be in paid employment respectively, relative to self-
employment. Similarly, these two groups are also much less likely to be non-employed,
relative to self-employment. The decrease in paid employment in the post-TRA86 period
for the two treatment groups is offset by increases in self-employment and non-employment.
The increase in self-employment is significant for both groups and implies a 26% and 31%
increase for the two treatment groups respectively, as a function of the predicted probability
of self-employment, 0.0559.
20To minimize measurement error due to possible mis-coding of the unemployed and those out of the labor
force, I combine both these categories into the non-employed category.
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The bottom panel reports relative risk ratios for single women relative to married women,
and these are similar to the ratios in the top panel. The marginal effects of the interaction
term (Single*Post), -0.0155 and -0.0085, imply a 2% and 3% decrease in wage employment
and non-employment respectively among single women after TRA86, relative to the cor-
responding predicted probabilities of 0.6849 and 0.2594. However, the marginal effect for
non-employment is imprecisely estimated. The marginal effect of self-employment in the
post-TRA86 period is 0.0071 for single women, implying a 13% increase relative to the pre-
dicted probability of that outcome, 0.0557. In summary, the results of the multinomial logit
estimation are smaller than those those of the corresponding Probit estimates. This is not
surprising given that these estimates are based on the sample of employed as well as non-
employed women. Nevertheless, they are qualitatively similar to the results based on the
sample of employed women only.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I study the effect of the husband’s employer-provided family health insurance
on the wife’s propensity to select into self-employment. A consistent finding in the literature
on women’s self-employment in the U.S. since the mid-1970s is the predominance of married
women in this sector. While numerous papers have remarked on the relationship between
spousal health insurance and a married woman’s propensity to be self-employed, the lack of
an exogenous source of variation in health insurance prices made it difficult to convincingly
test for a causal effect of insurance prices on employment-sector choices.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) provides us with an opportunity to test this
relationship. The TRA86 introduced a tax subsidy for the self-employed to purchase health
insurance. Self-employed individuals who were already enjoying health insurance benefits
through a spouse were excluded from this benefit. Since the effect of the tax subsidy was
to lower the after-tax price of health insurance for those among the self-employed who were
purchasing their own health insurance, I predict that this subsidy increased the incidence of
self-employment among this group of women.
My findings are in line with Gruber and Poterba (1994), who estimate large increases in
21
insurance take-up following the introduction of the tax subsidy in TRA86, especially among
single individuals.21 My estimates indicate that health insurance coverage through the spouse
strongly influenced a married woman’s employment sector choice towards self-employment
in the pre-TRA86 period. Moreover, the incidence of self-employment among single women
went up between 10% and 34% depending on the specification, in the post TRA86 period.
These findings support the hypothesis that the decrease in the after-tax price of health
insurance through the tax subsidy lowered the cost of selecting into self-employment for
those women who had no spousal health coverage. The findings in this paper suggest that in
the pre-TRA86 period, the high cost of health insurance created a significant wedge in the
price of health insurance between the wage-salary sector and self-employment. Women who
had a preference for working in the self-employment sector and who enjoyed spousal health
benefits were able to exercise their preference and select into self-employment. On the other
hand, for some women with a preference for the self-employment sector but constrained
to purchase their own health insurance, it was too costly to opt for this sector. For these
women, the TRA86, by narrowing this price wedge, lowered the price of selecting into their
desired sector of employment.
21Gumus and Regan (2007) also find a large responsive to health insurance prices among single women.
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Figure 1: Self-Employment Rates 






























Figure 2: Female Self-Employment Rates by Marital Status
































































































































Decrease by 0-10% 48%
Decrease by more than 10% 11%
Increase by more than 10% 4%
Increase by 0-10% 23%
No change 14%
Figure 4: Marginal Tax Rate Change Distribution, following TRA86
Source: Hausman and Poterba (1987), Fig.1, p.104
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Table 1: Self-Employment Rates of Women and Men
in the Nonagricultural Sector, 1975-1989 (%)
Year Total Women Men
1975 7.4 4.1 10.0
1979 8.6 5.3 11.3
1989 9.4 6.6 11.9
Source: Devine (1994a); Note: Includes individuals 16
years and older. Includes workers in both incorporated
and unincorporated businesses
Table 2: Average After-Tax Price of Health Insurance





High-income Self-Employed 1.455 1.307
(0.065) (0.041)
Low-income Self-Employed 1.389 1.355
(0.078) (0.068)
High-income Employed 0.900 0.902
(0.038) (0.029)
Low-income Employed 0.950 0.953
(0.046) (0.042)
Source: Gruber and Poterba (1994), Table I, p.709. Reprinted with permission from
Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Jonathan Gruber and James Poterba.
The prices are calculated as the ratio of the tax-adjusted price of health insurance to
the cost of self-insurance for each category. ‘High-income’ refers to incomes in excess of
$50,000 in 1985 dollars while ‘low-income’ refers to incomes below $20,000. Figures in
















































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Percent Distribution of Women Workers in Non-Agricultural
Occupations, by Selected Characteristics, 1984-85 and 1990-91
Wage-Employment Self-Employment
1984-85 1990-91 Difference 1984-85 1990-91 Difference
Age (Mean Years) 38.75 38.32 -0.43*** 41.28 42.45 1.17***
(11.61) (11.19) (10.84) (10.44)
Dependents Yes 23.39 21.30 -2.09*** 24.19 21.64 -2.55***
(42.33) (40.94) (42.84) (41.18)
Race White 85.89 84.22 -1.67*** 93.77 92.35 -1.42***
(34.82) (36.46) (24.17) (26.58)
Live in Yes 25.59 24.77 -0.82*** 20.17 18.66 -1.51
Central City (43.64) (43.17) (40.14) (38.96)
Education HS and Less 57.79 50.15 -7.64*** 53.46 48.33 -5.13***
(49.39) (50.01) (49.89) (49.98)
Some College 36.68 42.67 5.99*** 41.40 43.12 1.72
(48.20) (49.46) (49.27) (49.53)
> 5 yrs College 5.53 7.18 1.65*** 5.14 8.55 3.41***
(22.85) (25.82) (22.10) (27.97)
Marital Status Single 28.91 36.79 7.88*** 14.95 21.35 6.4***
(45.34) (48.22) (35.67) (40.98)
Among Married
Husband has 43.10 48.61 5.51*** 50.83 50.46 -0.37
EHI∗ (49.52) (49.98) (50.01) (50.01)
Husband SE + 7.38 10.71 3.33*** 26.20 41.54 15.34***
(26.15) (30.93) (43.98) (49.29)
Live in State with Yes 13.77 15.36 1.59*** 15.94 16.73 0.79
No State Taxes (34.46) (36.06) (36.62) (37.33)
Family Income Yes 0.0105 0.0117 0.0012 0.0303 0.0353 0.005
>50,000@ (0.1022) (0.1076) (0.1716) (0.1845)
Observations 21,558 54,008 1,827 4,838
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations; * EHI - Health insurance
through employer; + SE - Self-Employed; @ Indicator variable that equals 1 if
family non-earnings income > $50,000 in real terms.
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Table 5: Probit Estimates of Women’s Self-Employment Choices
(Marginal Effects)
Control Variables 2 3
Age (years) 0.0116*** 0.0121***
(0.0006) (0.0007)
Live in Central City -0.0125*** -0.0135***
(0.0025) (0.0028)
Education, Base Category High School or less High School or less
Some College 0.013*** 0.014***
(0.0019) (0.0022)




Marital Status, Base Category: Married, Access to Spousal HI+ Married
T1: Single -0.0532*** -0.0508***
(0.004) (0.0043)
T2: Married, no Access to -0.0192***
Spousal HI (0.0037)
Post TRA86 -0.012*** 0.004*
(0.0031) (0.0024)




Dependents = Yes 0.0334*** 0.0288***
(0.0037) (0.0032)
Family Income>50,000@ 0.0667*** 0.0726***
(in 2000 $) (0.0100) (0.011)
Live in No Tax State 0.0100*** 0.0127***
(Live NSIT) (0.0025) (0.0029)
Federal MTR -0.0012*** -0.0012***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Predicted Probability 0.0706 0.0811
Observations 85,264 85,264
Note: Figures in parentheses are (robust) standard errors; +HI -Health insurance
*** - significant at the 99% level; ** - significant at the 95% level;* - significant at the
90% level
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Table 6: Difference-in-Difference Estimates By Marital Status and Age
(Marginal Effects)
Age-Group 18-64 24-53 54-64
Panel A
T1: Single -0.0532*** -0.0544*** -0.0765***
(0.004) (0.0046) (0.0112)
T2: Married, no -0.0192*** -0.0209*** -0.0367***
Access to Spousal HI (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0115)
T1*Post Reform 0.024*** 0.0245*** 0.0446***
(0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0185)
T2*Post Reform 0.0398*** 0.0418*** 0.0608***
(0.006) (0.0071) (0.0204)
Predicted Probability 0.0706 0.0731 0.0966
Panel B: Including Business-Cycle Effects+
T1: Single -0.0749*** -0.0772*** -0.0863*
(0.0145) (0.0163) (0.0423)
T2: Married, no -0.0101 -0.0124 -0.0158
Access to Spousal HI (0.0141) (0.0161) (0.0477)
T1*Post Reform 0.0407*** 0.0419*** 0.0675*
(0.0129) (0.0154) (0.0365)
T2*Post Reform 0.0306*** 0.0331*** 0.0519**
(0.0092) (0.0105) (0.0332)
Predicted Probability 0.0707 0.0732 0.0968
Note: This table reports the marginal effects from Probit estimates of equation
2. Dependent variable takes the value 1 if individual is self-employed, 0 otherwise.
The regression includes controls for age, education, race, residence in central city,
residence in state with no state income taxes, presence of dependent children, es-
timated federal marginal taxes and family non-earnings income. Standard errors,
using the Delta method, are in parentheses.
+ Estimates in this panel include additional controls for the male unemployment
rate in the pre-reform and post-reform periods, interacted with the treatment group
indicators.
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Table 7: Multinomial Logit Estimates: Relative Risk Ratios (RRR), Marginal Effects (ME)
(N=120,812 )
(Base Outcome: Self-Employment)
Wage Employment Non-Employment Self-Employment
RRR ME RRR ME ME
Control Group: Married Women with Access to HI
Treatment Groups:
T1: Single Women 2.4787∗∗∗ 0.2687∗∗∗ 0.5141∗∗∗ -0.2429∗∗∗ -0.0258∗∗∗
(0.1905) (0.0416)
T2: Married, no Access to HI 1.4096∗∗∗ 0.1906∗∗∗ 0.4500∗∗∗ -0.1865∗∗∗ -0.0041
(0.0846) (0.0288)
Post TRA86 (Post) 1.1828∗∗∗ 0.0602∗∗∗ 0.8775∗∗∗ 0.0558∗∗∗
(0.0500) (0.0395)
T1*Post 0.6838 ∗∗∗ -0.0886∗∗∗ 1.0239 0.0739 0.0147∗∗∗
(0.0563) (0.0885)
T2*Post 0.5883 ∗∗∗ -0.1564∗∗∗ 1.2065∗∗∗ 0.1392∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗
(0.0384) (0.0836)
Predicted probability at X 0.6897 0.2544 0.0559
Control Group: Married Women
Treatment Group: Single Women 2.1515∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗ -0.1523∗∗∗ -0.0257∗∗∗
(0.1493) (0.0617)
Post TRA86 (Post) 0.9438∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ 0.9969 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0022
(0.0299) (0.0.0337)
Single*Post 0.8642 ∗∗ -0.0155 ∗∗ 0.9132 -0.0085 0.0071∗
(0.067) (0.0741)
Predicted probability at X 0.6849 0.2594 0.0557
Note: The regressions includes controls for age, education, race, residence in central city, residence in
state with no state income taxes, marginal tax rates and indicator for presence of dependent children.
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.
*** - significant at 99% level; ** - significant at 95% level; * - significant at 90% level
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